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Debating intoxication: Response to commentaries
The lack of scientific or clinical clarity faced by courts dealing
with cases involving intoxicated criminal defendants is
unavoidable, but introducing further legal ambiguity to meet
policy goals introduces ever greater risk of problematic
(including unjust) legal outcomes.
We thank Robert MacCoun [1] and Johann Koehler [2] for
their insightful commentaries on our Addiction Opinion
and Debate article [3], in which we discuss Rv Taj [4], a re-
cent judgement from the Court of Appeal (CA) of England
and Wales (E&W). Their expert commentaries highlight
and discuss a number of important points, including how
scientific and legal reasoningmore often collide, differences
and complexities around causal reasoning in science and
law, and what relation wemight conceive between holding
a person responsible and blaming (or praising) them.Word
restrictions prevent us addressing all these important
points, so we limit ourselves to the following.
First, Koehler is certainly correct that the criminal law
is prone to cling to simplistic concepts (proxies) that may
fail to adequately engage with the complexities of scientific
and/or clinical understanding. We see this in different
areas (as usefully described by Koehler), including in the
context of intoxication and the legal distinctions between
insanity and automatism. A useful, and lamentable, exam-
ple of this is the internal/external cause divide used to le-
gally separate potential cases of insanity and automatism.
When applied to those causing harms while suffering a di-
abetic coma, defendant 1, with hypoglycaemia as a result
of injecting insulin and a lack of eating (an external cause),
might avail herself of automatism and an unqualified ac-
quittal; while defendant 2, with hyperglycaemia brought
on by lack of insulin (an internal cause), would have to
plead insanity. The scientific and moral distinctions here
are minimal, but the legal outcome for our defendants is
very different.
However, the CA’s decision in Taj (setting precedent go-
ing forward) was not simply a rejection of scientific/clinical
complexity (i.e. holding to a simplistic legal definition of
intoxication), but a rejection of long‐established legal
doctrine as well (i.e. a change from the simple ‘drug‐on‐
board’ assumption; e.g. [5]). As we discuss in our article,
what appears to be driving the reasoning is not scientific
or legal oversimplification, but what appears to be an ex-
pression of normative outcome logic: the court decided that
Taj was bad, not mad. MacCoun’s reference to motivated
cognition may well offer a psychological explanation for
such logic.
There is some basis for this normative conclusion, use-
fully illustrated by MacCoun, although it involves complex
analysis of Taj’s prior‐fault over months/years of substance
abuse. We see prior‐fault logic of this kind applied to insan-
ity cases in other (civil‐law) jurisdictions, and also regularly
mooted in common‐law ones. However, there is currently
(in E&W) no legal device for applying a prior‐fault rule to
insanity cases; nothing from legislative or jurisprudential
sources. On that basis, the court in Taj were wrong to find
him liable, and wrong to dress their ad‐hoc outcome logic in
a veneer of scientific legitimacy; indeed, we see enough of
that from politicians lately!
We appreciate MacCoun’s clarifications about causal
reasoning in the law and agree that the type of multiple‐
step, trace analysis illustrated in his Fig. 1 [1] offers a valid
model of the sort of more complex causal reasoning we
(implicitly or explicitly) adopt when deciding moral respon-
sibility and blameworthiness. Specific to Taj, of course he
had multiple past occasions when he might have decided
to restrain from drink and/or drug taking (especially when
on at least one of these occasions he also subsequently
experienced delusions), so some responsibility and blame
seems appropriate. Whether this should prevent him from
raising a defence altogether and a resulting sentence of
19 years for attemptedmanslaughter is a complex question
which we discuss in further detail elsewhere [6]. However,
the issue is less about whether the court was wrong in Taj
specifically and more whether the wider and fuzzier
definition of intoxication going forward increases the odds
of problematic, undirected decisions. We, and both
commentators, think it will.
Finally, a few brief words in relation to addiction which,
although not directly at play in Taj, raises interesting legal
and moral question, and around which there is a signifi-
cant literature (e.g. [7–9]), including some recent empirical
work of our own [10]. Models such as proposed by Pickard,
and endorsed by MacCoun, are indeed a more promising
and interesting means to break the moralistic ‘War on
Drugs’ deadlock. Perhaps the development of so‐called
Drug Courts in the United States, United Kingdom and
other places are a cautious expression of this sort of more
progressive, forward‐looking and constructive way of
thinking and, as mentioned, holding addicts responsible
(at least for their addiction) while not looking to blame
has important therapeutic benefits (e.g. [11]). The
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